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There is a massive and vital capital market at work in Canada — possibly bigger than rough estimates have so 
far suggested — and it is one for which several market regulators are preparing new rules. Yet the remarkable 
thing is how little we know about it. Data about the so-called exempt market are so lacking that were regulators 
in Ontario and the other provinces contemplating new exempt-market regulations to proceed, they would be 
creating policies based on anecdotal, incomplete and, potentially, incorrect evidence.
Even estimating the size of the Canadian exempt market has been an inexact science, given the incomplete data, 
but we can estimate that it provides in excess of $100 billion in gross capital flow every year, and that amount 
continues to grow. While it may be natural to assume that the exempt market is used primarily by small and 
medium-sized enterprises, it seems it is primarily used by the financial services industry. These institutions appear 
to rely on the exempt market to raise potentially short-term debt capital relatively free of particularly burdensome 
information-disclosure requirements. Unfortunately, we are forced to rely here again on deductions based on 
limited evidence: So incomplete are the data about the exempt market that we lack even complete information 
on the type of issuers, investors and securities, or the volume and duration of the securities and the level of 
redemptions.
The exempt market exists for important reasons: it is a way out of the regulatory conundrum, wherein the 
regulator’s mandate to protect investors, through significant requirements for information disclosure, can put too 
large a burden on certain issuers. 
That is why it is essential that any new regulations are developed using a thorough understanding of how it 
operates. Yet the reality is that it is impossible to evaluate how individual investors and small firms are using the 
exempt market, or their experience in it. This is disconcerting, given that the very logic behind regulating this 
market is to allow the cost-effective and efficient matchmaking of sophisticated, higher-risk capital to firms unable 
to access capital through other means. If minimal or no data are available for analysis (as is currently the case), 
there is no way to tell whether this is in fact happening.
This should be rectified before new regulations are imposed. Provincial jurisdictions and major market participants 
should co-operate to form an “exempt market data repository” to collect structured data, funded through a small 
fee, based on the size and type of issue. This repository should allow for segmentation by industry, size of issuer, 
and by whether it is a reporting issuer or not, and it should provide detail on the size of each issue, the types 
of security, the intended use of the capital, and the liquidity and duration of the security, as well as requiring 
notification of redemptions. Reporting the costs of intermediation should be mandatory and the accumulated data 
should indicate the type of investor (segmented by categories such as “accredited” or “eligible”) as well as the 
investment size and type. 
Of course, none of this should become so costly as to render the exempt market prohibitive to the issuers who 
rely on it. Nor should it necessarily lead to more onerous regulations. Indeed, another important priority must be 
a broader debate over the very role of a securities regulator when it comes to regulating capital flows between 
investors and issuers. But at a very minimum, regulators should be able to make available to investors useful 
information about how a market operates. Unfortunately, when it comes to the exempt market, that responsibility 
is the very area where Canadian regulators have so far proved to be remiss.
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1INTRODUCTION
Even before Christopher Columbus asked Spain’s King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella to fund his highly 
risky expedition to find a western route to the Orient, entrepreneurs and investors have struggled to 
raise capital in ways that satisfy both parties’ risk-return thresholds.1 The advent of stock exchanges 
in the 17th century, following the East India Company offering, allowed investors to have access to 
information provided by the companies at the time of issuance and then on an ongoing basis.2 Since 
investors required credible and timely information and full transparency, regulations and regulatory 
bodies were formed to ensure that this was made mandatory for companies accessing capital in the 
public marketplace, powers that were then extended to most capital flows (public or private) to try 
to ensure that investors receive adequate and timely information. This information may also lead to 
improved governance practices and management accountability. 
So long as regulators are able to ensure that sufficient and timely information is made available to 
investors, that the costs of providing and receiving this information is “reasonable” and that the penalties 
for providing knowingly false or late information are “sufficiently large,” we could be assured of an 
informationally efficient capital market where investors can invest in risky securities and expect to 
earn risk-adjusted returns that, on average, equate if not exceed their opportunity costs. This would 
be true for both publicly listed and private companies raising capital from external investors. As noted 
below, the applicability and the impact of information availability and disclosure is important when one 
discusses the role of the “exempt” market in Canada. As will be seen, the exempt market is different 
than publicly listed markets since investors that are allowed to invest in the securities in this market are 
qualified using rules and classifications.3
The main purpose of this paper is to review the current state of the exempt market in Canada, its role 
in matching investors with those who require capital, and the optimal role for regulation of information 
disclosure in order for this matching to take place. As described below, the exempt market can be 
considered as one situated between no disclosure and full disclosure and it is restricted to investors that 
meet specific criteria. It should also be noted that it may be better to use the term “private placement” 
or “private capital” to describe this market rather than the “exempt” market. The term “exempt market” 
may lead to a conclusion that the market is exempt from regulation or disclosure but, as will be seen 
below, that is not the case. 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this paper are threefold: First, the paper situates the exempt market 
within the context of the various avenues for raising risk capital and associated information-disclosure 
regimes, and compares and contrasts the nature of some other mechanisms. It also briefly addresses 
alternative ways of raising capital resulting from the advances in Internet communication, such as 
crowdfunding and the JOBS Act (or the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act) in the U.S.4 Second, this 
paper documents the scale and scope of the exempt market. Third, this paper provides observations and 
some recommendations that may assist in improving the current exempt-market regime by ensuring a 
1 
It took Columbus seven years and multiple attempts to get the proper funding. He even had to find “private equity” to fund 
his quests and agree on a revenue-sharing formula.
2 
Although the East India Company received a royal charter from Queen Elizabeth in 1600, the Dutch East India Company 
was the first company to issue stock and is considered to have been the first truly multi-national company.
3 
The exempt market, or more specifically the “exempt securities market” in Canada, relates to that portion of the capital 
markets for which, under provincial securities legislation, certain exemptions are provided from the full requirements of 
prospectus-level disclosure as well as from the full requirements for registered dealers in conducting sales. 
4 
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act came into law in April 2012. While only certain provisions under the JOBS Act 
became effective immediately upon enactment, those involving Title III (i.e., crowdfunding) have yet to be implemented. 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and the United States Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) published proposed crowdfunding rules in October 2013, with the comment period ending in early  
2014. However, there has been no further publication as the industry awaits the final rules or further changes to the 
proposed rules.
2balance between the “naïve” investor (as viewed by the regulators) and the perfectly informed investor 
(as viewed by some capital market participants). The analysis presented in this paper shows that the 
current state of data and information available on the exempt market is inadequate for informing 
any significant policy debate or for imposing new regulations. This paper does not provide data or 
conclusions on the costs and benefits of the current regulatory regime in the exempt market, nor does 
it comment on whether or not the current or new regulations are appropriate from the perspective of 
investors and issuers. As a backdrop, it must also be noted that the recent experience in the public 
markets has shown that no amount of disclosure may reduce the imbalance between investors (large or 
small) and issuers/firms and that no market is immune to significant information asymmetry between 
issuers and investors and corresponding losses or gains from their investments. 
CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF SECURITIES REGULATORS5
Since this paper is about the “exempt market,” it is important to provide some context for the role 
of a securities regulator in the exchange of capital between the saver (investor) and the user (firm). 
In addition, it is important to discuss this role in the context of the size of the firm/issuer and that of 
an investor, since large firms and large (wealthy, knowledgeable and/or institutional) investors have 
different information requirements than those of small firms and small investors. The same is true 
depending on whether the amount raised is small or large and whether it is in the form of debt or equity. 
Similar to Columbus, the typical journey of an entrepreneur begins with financing a business idea 
through sweat equity and personal resources and then, as the idea outgrows the ability for self-financing, 
to seek equity funding from external sources. In that stage of the journey, capital providers are mostly 
family and friends (so-called “love” or “faith” money) and business associates who may not have any 
expectations of earning a rate of return on their investment. The investment amount is typically small 
and investors trust the entrepreneur due to their personal familiarity. There is no real need for extensive 
disclosure of information between the two parties since there exists a form of trust between the parties 
as a result of the relationship. The next stage requires the entrepreneur to formally seek higher amounts 
of external capital through “angel” investors who have expectations of earning a reasonable rate of 
return given the obvious risk and illiquidity associated with their investment. At that stage, the onus 
is on the entrepreneur/firm to provide the information required by these arm’s-length investors who 
would demand information that is relevant to them prior to making an investment decision. This would 
happen irrespective of any regulation as a matter of expected commercial practice. If the entrepreneur 
passes through this stage and requires additional external capital, the next step would be the raising of 
additional risk capital from venture capital or private equity firms, which would also have their own 
information requirements. If more financing is required and it is not available from private markets, the 
firm may initiate an initial public offering (IPO) and possible stock-exchange listing with all its required 
regulatory disclosures, and ultimately raising further capital from the additional issuance of securities 
(secondary equity offerings or SEOs) as a reporting issuer (public company).6 
It is clear that as this journey from self-finance to secondary public offering continues, the need 
for credible information disclosure and associated costs increases due to an obvious information 
asymmetry between the entrepreneur/firm and investors. In some cases, investors do not have the 
personal knowledge, ability, time or desire to seek information directly from the entrepreneur or 
analyze its veracity. The role for this information transmission falls on the stock exchanges (in case of 
5 
In this paper we focus mainly on “risky” equity capital and not on the less risky debt-capital requirements of governments 
and large firms. 
6 
This traditional model of using an IPO as the only market vehicle to raise risk capital is now being substituted by accessing 
capital from institutional investors or private strategic- or merchant-banking buyers. In the U.S., there have been over 400 
such transactions worth at least US$50 million each from January 2011 to June 2014. 
3stock-exchange transactions), and the corresponding securities regulators impose rules for information 
disclosure and disclosure frequency.7 The information disclosure regulation typically requires that the 
information be readily available, accessible and timely, and its intent is to provide sufficient information 
for an investor to assess his or her investment risk without imposing excessive costs on the issuer. The 
firm (its directors and officers) are held accountable for providing correct and truthful information, 
ensuring that no one gains special access to knowledge that could provide an investment advantage. 
The regulation and the environment for information exchange have changed considerably since the 17th 
century. There is a recognition that since the creation, provision, and analysis of information has costs, 
there has to be a proper cost-benefit balance to determine the optimal level of information provision.8 
Moreover, other participants in the market place, such as financial analysts and large institutional 
investors, can analyze various disclosures made by firms and provide insights to individual investors 
who may not have the expertise or the time required to conduct credible analysis; especially for 
firms listed on a stock exchange. Moreover, there may be some investors who may not need any such 
regulations about information disclosure or analysis. These investors have analytical capabilities and the 
degree of disclosure to them should not matter to regulators if these investors are the only ones investing 
in that security without any participation by other, less sophisticated investors.9 One could also argue 
that if firms want to raise capital at a reasonable rate of return, they can and would voluntarily provide 
additional information and undertake costly signals so as to minimize the standard moral-hazard/
adverse-selection problem independent of any regulation.10 
Since disclosure of information and analysis of the disclosed information impose costs on the provider 
and the recipient respectively, it is also clear that there are economies of scale at play. Large firms 
can afford the disclosure costs and large institutional investors can afford to analyze the received 
information. Moreover, if large investors can influence the valuation of a firm, then it is incumbent on 
the firms to provide good and timely information as required since it would be in their best interest to do 
so. The failure to do so may increase the firm’s cost of capital and restrain its growth. In this scenario, 
one could even say that the role of the securities regulator is minimal since it is in the self-interest of 
both the firm and the investor to ensure that there is adequate information. As noted later in greater 
detail, this may be one of the reasons for exempting issuers from extensive disclosure for accredited 
investors and investors who can invest a minimum amount of at least $150,000.
Conversely, the information disclosure environment for small investors is different. These small 
investors may not have an independent way to ensure that the level, timeliness, and truthfulness of 
information provided to them is adequate to make the right risk-return tradeoff decisions, and this 
is where the role of the regulator becomes crucial.11 If a regulator makes the information-provision 
and -reporting requirements too onerous, then the issuing firm may decide not to raise capital due 
to associated costs, which would likely negatively impact its growth and, on an aggregate basis, our 
economy. At a macro level, similar actions by many firms would decrease GDP growth and limit the 
7 
Canada does not have a national securities regulator such as the SEC in the United States. So various provincial and 
territorial regulatory bodies have jurisdiction on the rules surrounding the raising of capital by entrepreneurs/firms in their 
respective jurisdiction. However, Canadian securities regulators often work together and publish national or multilateral 
instruments where some or all Canadian jurisdictions adopt harmonized or quasi-harmonized rules that they have 
negotiated among themselves.
8 
For a condensed view on economics of information, see Jack M. Mintz and Finn Poschmann, “Investor Confidence and the 
Market for Good Corporate Governance,” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 1 (August 2002).
9 
This exclusion of unsophisticated investors in specific transaction is important since one set of investors may have access to 
information that may give them a competitive advantage in valuing the underlying security. 
10 
Costly signals may include: a higher ownership in the firm, paying out a large fraction of earnings as dividends, and the 
hiring of reputed and expensive audit firms, among other mechanisms. These signals are termed as “costly” since these 
signals need to be undertaken to convince outsiders about the credibility of insiders and for no other reason.
11 
In this discussion, we focus on small investors; investors such as venture capital firms have their own requirements and do 
not need to depend on the regulator for such information.
4number of investment vehicles and opportunities for diversification for investors.12 It should be also 
noted that there is an inherent assumption in this line of reasoning. It assumes that small investors have 
the ability to digest the information being provided and analyze it to understand the merits of the issue 
from a risk-return perspective. In contrast, if a securities regulator makes the disclosure too lenient, 
there is a potential for bad-quality firms to crowd out good-quality firms, which could result in low or 
negative rates of return for investors and their eventual unwillingness to provide capital in such a risky 
environment. This would reduce GDP growth at the macro level and investors may not have adequate 
investment vehicles for their savings. In addition, since these firms and the size of the transactions are 
small, there is less incentive for “information intermediaries” to analyze the available information and 
provide independent advice to investors, since the cost associated with conducting such analysis may 
far outweigh the benefits. This situation can be described as the “regulator’s conundrum,” in which the 
regulator wants to ensure the right level of information disclosure but has to be cognizant of the costs of 
providing and validating such information. 
Thus, one could argue that there are three specific situations in which the role of a securities regulator 
is less critical. First, if only large investors participate in the market, they may have a scale advantage 
in demanding and analyzing information; this would automatically impose discipline on the firm 
to provide the right information. However, if the penalty is small for providing less-than-adequate 
information or material misrepresentation, then some firms may still try to provide false information (or 
will be less diligent in providing accurate information, which may result in providing less-than-accurate 
information) hoping that investors would find it difficult to separate false information from genuine 
optimism about a firm’s future.13 Second, one may argue that the cost of receiving and acting on bad 
information may be small if investors invest relatively low amounts of their capital in individual firms 
and, consequently, diversification benefits may limit overall risk — i.e., some investments would do 
well and others would not. In this case, the securities regulator may simply impose an absolute as well 
as a relative limit on the amount that can be invested by an investor (i.e., investor caps) in individual 
issuers or issues and no other regulation may be required, meaning once a low limit is set on both 
parties, diversification would be at play.14 However, one may argue that even in this case, there is a 
real possibility that bad-quality firms will crowd out good-quality firms and eventually markets would 
fail.15 Third, it is possible that independent-analyst firms would be formed with the specific purpose of 
providing unbiased and independent advice to investors for a fee, which then would allow investors to 
12 
This point is also made with respect to the Canadian IPO market in Bryce C. Tingle, J. Arie Pandes and Michael J. 
Robinson, “The IPO market in Canada: What a comparison with the United States tells us about a global problem,” 
Canadian Business Law Journal 54 (2013): 321-367.
13 
It should be noted that, on an ex-post basis, it is hard to decide whether the firm provided knowingly false information or if 
it was just optimistic about its future. This issue is evident in regulations that allow stock-exchange-listed firms in Canada 
to voluntarily provide information of future earnings during the initial public offering process. See: Vijay Jog and Bruce 
McConomy, “Voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses,” Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting 30, 1 & 2 (2003): 125-167. This is especially the case if the firm a) believes that it is a “one-period” game 
and it may not need to raise any additional capital; and b) if the firm is controlled by a majority shareholder who is therefore 
immune to the takeover market for corporate control. One would also argue that since very few individuals were prosecuted 
about various seemingly illegal acts during the 2009 financial markets crisis, the penalty for inadequate or bad information 
is limited. 
14 
That does not mean that the regulator should impose such quantitative limits; these limits may actually reduce the amount 
and increase the cost of capital available for a small firm, as it would have to seek a much larger number of investors to meet 
its capital needs. 
15 
This is well explained in the seminal article by G. Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 3 (1970): 488-500. This is an example where, due to adverse selection, 
buyers do not know the quality of sellers and it can cause a market not to exist or can penalize “good” sellers.
5make the right selection.16 However, even in this case, investors may face moral-hazard and adverse-
selection issues as they will have to ensure the authenticity of these advisory firms and these firms may 
be interested in providing analysis only for large transactions. 
Based on the above, one may concede that the role of a securities regulator is to ensure an optimum level 
of regulation so that small investors are reasonably assured that the information provided to them is 
relevant, accurate and timely and that the penalty for providing false and late information is significant; 
this may be especially true in the case of small and unknown firms and if the issues are unsecured 
(e.g., equity). On the other hand, if large firms/issuers are raising capital from large and financial 
knowledgeable investors, the disclosure requirements could be much less stringent or even non-existent. 
It is therefore obvious that the role of the securities regulator is not straightforward even in the private 
capital markets. This becomes even more obvious if firms bypass the traditional process of going 
through an intermediary firm (which itself has to abide by the regulations) and instead appeal directly to 
a large number of individual investors for relatively small amounts of money through a “non-brokered” 
private placement. One proposed new way to access “retail investors” is through what is called “equity 
crowdfunding.”17 
In equity crowdfunding, the entrepreneur connects with potential investors via a website or portal and 
provides information about his or her idea to seek funding from individual investors. Capital raised in 
this way typically comes in very small amounts,18 with investors leveraging mobile-payment facilities 
such as PayPal. Naturally, there is a potential for exposing investors to ideas that may have limited or 
zero possibility of earning a positive rate of return or that are fraudulent. However, this new way of 
raising capital has low costs, and higher-risk capital can be raised in a relatively short period of time 
compared to a similar process under traditional funding methods. This mechanism allows small and 
entrepreneurial firms to access relatively small amounts of capital, increase jobs, and contribute to 
the overall growth of the economy. However, the total amount raised through crowdfunding would be 
modest at best and therefore would have a particularly limited macroeconomic impact.19
Even with such modest contribution to the overall flow of capital and small amounts raised from 
individual investors, the regulatory response to such alternative mechanisms of raising capital has been 
swift, yet the actual implementation of new rules has been slow. In the U.S., President Barack Obama 
signed the JOBS Act into law in April 2012; however Title III, involving equity crowdfunding, has yet 
to become effective. The new law stipulates that entrepreneurs will be able to raise money from any and 
all types of U.S. investors; however, start-ups are limited to raising $1 million per year, and can only 
do so through portals approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The legislation increased the 500-shareholder rule, which put a 
limit on the number of shareholders a company was allowed to have before registering with the SEC (and 
going public) to a 2,000-shareholder rule.20 Similar reaction was seen in Canada from certain provincial 
16 
These types of independent advisory firms do exist, with the role of providing pure advice on the merits of information 
provided by firms. However, these firms limit themselves to only publicly listed large firms. It is not clear as to whether they 
have any specific expertise in this activity. See: Jeffery F. Jaffe and James M. Mahoney, “The Performance of Investment 
Newsletters,” Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999): 289-307.
17 
Equity crowdfunding is different than non-equity crowdfunding, which involves donation, pre-paid/pre-purchase and 
rewards-based campaigns (not offerings), since in the latter type a “contributor” does not obtain a financial or equity 
interest in a firm.
18 
Since the total amount raised is typically small, these investments do not draw any interest from the typical venture capital 
or private equity firm.
19 
See Jeffrey MacIntosh, “Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowdfunding,” National Post, July 31, 2013.
20 
The growth in the approved portals in the U.S. has been considerable, with over 500 portals already approved and a large 
number in the pipeline waiting to be approved. However, that does not mean these are equity-funding portals; many of these 
may be just charity or donation-oriented portals. Additional information can be found on www.crowdsourcing.org. Also 
note that the SEC has not yet made final decisions regarding crowdfunding regulations.
6securities commissions, but just like the JOBS Act, they too have been slow in implementation. For 
example, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and the regulators of five other provinces have 
proposed that a firm can raise a maximum of $1.5 million in equity in any 12-month period and 
that individuals are allowed to invest no more than $2,500 in a single offering, up to a maximum of 
$10,000 per year. The British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) and the regulators of five other 
provinces are looking at a proposed crowdfunding start-up exemption, where a firm can raise $150,000 
per offering, twice a year (i.e., $300,000 per year), with individuals allowed to invest no more than 
$1,500 in a single offering without any annual maximum. The start-up exemption is currently legal in 
Saskatchewan only. In addition, securities regulators have also proposed that crowdfunding websites 
and portals be required to register with securities commissions, that they comply with the minimum 
capital and insurance requirements, and that they adhere to various reporting rules and requirements 
for conducting due diligence on companies and directors and officers using their website or portal. The 
portal under the start-up exemption would not have to be registered.
THE EXEMPT MARKET
One of the origins of the exempt market can be considered as the regulator’s response to the regulatory 
conundrum as it relates to information disclosure and investor protection. A trade-off is achieved by 
allowing certain exemptions to issuers from the full requirements of prospectus disclosure, while 
imposing certain classification rules to determine which investors are allowed to provide capital to these 
issuers. Thus, the exempt market is where capital can be raised under an exemption from the detailed 
prospectus-disclosure and -delivery requirements.
Although there has been a considerable movement to create a nationalized and harmonized prospectus-
exemptions regulation regime, requirements vary across provinces and territories.21 It is not the intent 
of this paper to describe specific differences between provincial/territorial securities regulations of the 
exempt market, since these are readily available elsewhere.22 Instead the focus of this paper is on those 
aspects that provide the context for understanding the scale and scope of the exempt market and the 
degree of information available to researchers and other interested parties to analyze the state and the 
efficacy of this market. 
In essence, there are three parties involved in the exempt market: the issuer or firm that needs access 
to capital and sells either equity or debt securities to investors; the investor who is willing to provide 
the funding; and, when required, an intermediary that facilitates the matchmaking between the issuer 
and the investor. One example of a matchmaker is an “exempt-market dealer” (EMD). A typical EMD 
is engaged in the business of trading and matchmaking between issuers and qualified eligible investors 
under existing prospectus exemptions, where it typically charges a fee as a percentage of the transaction 
value of the offering. An EMD may also participate in the promotion, distribution and trading (i.e., 
buying and selling) of exempt securities, as either a principal or agent. All EMDs are subject to 
extensive dealer-registration and -compliance requirements and are directly regulated by the provincial 
and territorial securities commissions.23 EMDs are required to meet substantial dealer obligations that 
include: educational proficiency, capital and solvency rules, insurance, audited financial statements, 
21 
This can be seen by analyzing various national policies such as NI 45-106, OSC SCP 45-710, and NI 31- 103.
22 
A very recent and excellent summary of the regulations can be found in Jack Mintz, “Muddling up the market: New exempt 
market regulations may do more harm than good to the integrity of markets,” The School of Public Policy Research Papers 
7, 30 (University of Calgary, November 2014).
23 
More specifically, EMDs are required to meet standard dealer obligations, which include: educational proficiency, capital 
and solvency rules, insurance, audited financial statements, know-your-client rules, know-your-product rules, trade 
suitability, compliance systems, record keeping, client statements, trade confirmations, disclosure of conflicts of interest 
and referral arrangements, etc. The EMD category of registration exists in all provinces and territories of Canada subject to 
certain exemptions from registration.
7“know-your-client” (KYC) rules, “know-your-product” (KYP) rules, trade suitability rules, compliance 
systems, record-keeping rules, client statements, trade confirmations, disclosure of conflicts of interest 
and referral arrangements, and more.24 The EMD category of registration exists in all provinces and 
territories of Canada and is subject to certain exemptions for registration.
With respect to the issuer and investor, the essence of the exempt-market regulation is simple: provide a 
minimum level of information that an investor who is considered as qualified (either by sophistication, 
relationship with the issuer, wealth or income) would require for making an informed investment 
decision. Certain provinces and territories may also exclude specific types of securities that can be 
issued in this market under prospectus exemptions.25 
Currently, if securities are sold to retail investors, investors are provided an offering document that 
contains information such as the intended use of proceeds, nature of business, capital structure, names 
of directors and principal holders, long-term objectives, identities of related parties and financial 
statements. In fact, under the offering-memorandum exemption,26 audited financial statements are 
legally required to be included in the offering memorandum and interim financial statements, subject 
to an exemption in certain jurisdictions if the amount being raised is less than $500,000.27 The other 
commonly used exemptions — i.e., accredited investors and friends or family — do not require any 
disclosure, however some disclosure is typically provided as a matter of commercial practice.
In addition, some corporate issuers in certain circumstances may be required to provide certain 
information including audited financial statements, changes to capital structure, nature of business, 
directors and management, and acquisition and perhaps disposal of assets.28. Not all provinces and 
territories require similar annual disclosure; some are satisfied with the provision of financial statements 
according to corporate law. Although the level of information disclosure may sound onerous, it can be 
much lower than the disclosure required in a prospectus of an initial public offering, and by lowering the 
disclosure requirements; higher-risk capital can flow more easily and at a reduced cost. 
This overall lower level of disclosure is counterbalanced by the restriction on the investor who, under 
the “accredited-investor exemption,” is considered an “accredited investor” by the virtue of investment 
sophistication — as measured by wealth or annual income or both — before he or she can invest in these 
“exempt” securities. Under NI 45-106, an accredited investor includes:
• an individual who has net assets, alone or with a spouse, of at least $5 million;
24 
In western provinces there is also a so-called “north west” exemption.
25 
As can be seen, securities issued in the exempt market are materially different from securities that can be traded easily on 
the public stock exchanges (i.e., liquid securities). Exempt-market securities are illiquid and there are certain restrictions 
on resale (i.e., it must rely on an exemption, such as accredited investor). The securities themselves aren’t different; it’s how 
the market is regulated that makes them different. Some types of securities are also subject to disclosure rules that apply not 
only at the time of sale but also on an annual basis. 
26 
See section 2.9 of National Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions (NI 45-106).
27 
On Dec. 20, 2012, members of the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) — excluding those from British Columbia 
and Ontario — published Multilateral CSA Notice 45-311: “Exemptions from Certain Financial Statement-Related 
Requirements in the Offering-Memorandum Exemption to Facilitate Access to Capital by Small Businesses.” Each CSA 
member (other than British Columbia and Ontario) issued a harmonized interim local order that provides an exemption from 
certain financial requirements set out in the offering-memorandum exemption. The order remains in force until Dec. 14, 
2014. The order provides relief from the audited-financial-statement requirement and the requirement for issuers to prepare 
financial statements using Canadian GAAP applicable to publicly accountable enterprises, provided that: (a) the issuer and 
related issuers raise no more than $500,000; (b) no investor invests more than $2,000 in any 12-month period; (c) the issuer 
is not a reporting issuer, investment fund, mortgage-investment entity or real estate issuer; (d) the issuer does not distribute 
complex securities; and (e) the offering memorandum contains a bold warning on the front page.
28 
Ontario has proposed disclosure under the proposed offering-memorandum exemption; other provinces require that the 
financial statements, as determined by corporate law, are provided.
8• an individual whose net income before taxes exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent cal-
endar years or whose net income before taxes combined with that of a spouse exceeded $300,000 in 
each of the two most recent calendar years and who, in either case, reasonably expects to exceed that 
net income in the calendar year; or
• an individual who, either alone or with a spouse, beneficially owns financial assets having an aggre-
gate realizable value that, before taxes but net of any related liabilities, exceeds $1,000,000.
There is another category of investor called an “eligible investor” that may invest in exempt-market 
securities pursuant to the offering-memorandum exemption. The offering-memorandum exemption 
requires, among other things, that a prescribed form of offering memorandum is provided to an investor 
along with a risk-acknowledgement form and, under the Alberta model29 of the offering-memorandum 
exemption, an investor can invest more than $10,000 if he or she is purchasing as principal and is an 
“eligible investor,” which includes:
a) a person whose 
(i) net assets, alone or with a spouse, exceed $400,000;
(ii) net income before taxes exceeded $75,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years and 
who reasonably expects to exceed that income level in the current calendar year; or 
(iii)  net income before taxes, alone or with a spouse, exceeded $125,000 in each of the two most 
recent calendar years and who reasonably expects to exceed that income level in the current 
calendar year.
b) a corporation in which a majority of the voting securities are beneficially owned by eligible investors 
or a majority of the directors are eligible investors;
c) a general partnership, of which all of the partners are eligible investors;
d) a limited partnership, of which the majority of the general partners are eligible investors;
e) a trust or estate, in which all of the beneficiaries or a majority of the trustees or executors are 
eligible investors;
f) an accredited investor;
g) a person described in section 2.5 (family, friends and business associates); 
h) a person that has obtained advice regarding the suitability of the investment and, if the person is 
resident in a jurisdiction of Canada, that advice has been obtained from an eligibility adviser.
Under the Alberta model of the offering-memorandum exemption, a non-eligible investor can purchase 
only amounts less than $10,000.30 
29 
There are two models of the offering-memorandum exemption in Canada; the “British Columbia model” and the “Alberta 
model.” The British Columbia model is followed by the provinces of British Columbia, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia 
and Newfoundland and Labrador. The Alberta model is followed by Alberta, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, 
Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon. Ontario has not adopted the offering-memorandum 
exemption, although it is presently considering it under proposed amendments to National Instrument 45-106: Prospectus 
and Registration Exemptions. 
30 
For those jurisdictions that follow the British Columbia model of the offering-memorandum exemption, the offering 
memorandum is available to any investor in any amount. There are no investor qualifications or investor or issuer 
investment limits. The CSA has recently proposed eliminating the minimum-amount exemption for individuals but not for 
institutions.
9While one may argue whether or not annual income or wealth conditions automatically lead to an 
individual being a financially sophisticated investor, the intent of the eligibility requirements is clear:31 
These individuals should understand (or seek advice from those who understand) the inherent risk-return 
trade-off of the proposed investment with information that is not as detailed as that which is provided 
in a prospectus.32 It is also interesting to note that the regulation does not propose any testing of the 
investor for financial literacy.33
Another important point about exempt markets is that these markets can be used by small and medium-
sized enterprises (or SMEs) that wish to raise risk capital from investors as an alternative to initial public 
offerings, which are becoming even more costly due to the disclosure requirements for a publicly traded 
company under applicable securities regulations. However, the exempt market is not just for SMEs and is 
being used by larger firms and large investors, as can be seen in the empirical section of the paper.34
In essence, the exemptions from full disclosure are based on the following premises:
• an investor has the ability withstand a financial loss;
• an investor has the ability to obtain the relevant information from the issuer (for example, the various 
exemptions for major institutional investors);
• an investor has sufficient knowledge of company principals to invest (e.g., close family, friends and 
business associates);
• an investor has sufficient information about an issuer (e.g., an exemption as a director, officer or 
employee);
• a security is subject to another regulatory scheme (certain co-operatives or real estate products);
• a security is simple to understand and low risk (e.g., government debt).
31 
Historically, the minimum-amount exemption under Section 2.10 of National Instrument 45-106: Prospectus and 
Registration Exemptions, was called the “sophisticated-investor exemption.” Currently, there are two types of exemptions, 
one for accredited investors and one that relates to the minimum-amount exemption.
32 
While the focus here is on the individual, it should be noted that an accredited-investor status is automatically bestowed on 
institutions, such as: Canadian financial institutions and Schedule III banks, the Business Development Bank of Canada, 
basically every government or Crown corporation, pension funds, and even registered charities. This automatic qualification 
has implications for the size of the exempt markets as described in the section on scale and scope of the exempt markets. 
33 
For example, Canadian Securities Administrators’ National Instrument 52-110: Audit Committees (NI 52-110), requires 
all members of the audit committee of the board of directors to be financially literate. According to NI 52-110, a director 
is financially literate if he or she has the ability to read and understand a set of financial statements that present a 
breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are reasonably comparable to the breadth and complexity of 
the issues that can be expected to be raised by the issuer’s financial statements. Many firms even provide a financial 
literacy self-test tool kit. See for example, http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.
servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/USEng/Documents/Audit%20Committee/Audit%20Committee%20Resource%20Guide/
financial%20literacy%20self%20assessment%20tool.pdf.  
A similar tool kit can be provided for those investors who may want to know what knowledge is required to be considered 
a “sophisticated” investor. In this regard, the OSC was proposing that to qualify as a “sophisticated” investor, the 
investor would have to satisfy two conditions. The first would be relevant work experience: the investor must have 
worked in the investment industry for at least one year in a position that requires knowledge of securities investments. 
The second condition would be meeting a relevant educational qualification: the investor must have earned or received 
either a Chartered Financial Analyst designation, a Chartered Investment Manager designation, or a Master in Business 
Administration (MBA) degree from an accredited university. This, however, would have excluded wealthy investors/
entrepreneurs who pursued wealth and job creation without formal education and have acquired considerable financial 
judgment through that experience. Moreover there is no guarantee that an individual specializing in human resource 
management in an MBA program may have better knowledge than a person from hard-knocks business background. In its 
August 2013 progress report, the OSC stated that it was no longer considering an investor sophistication exemption.
34 
For an excellent and updated summary of data and issues, please see Tingle, Pandes and Robinson, “The IPO.”
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THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF THE EXEMPT MARKET IN CANADA
Given the extent of the legislation, the regulators’ desire to deter and detect fraud and to ensure that 
the exempt market functions as intended, one would expect that the information about the overall scale 
and scope of this market would be readily available to researchers and other capital market participants 
so as to enable the evaluation of both the efficiency and the effectiveness of this market mechanism. 
However, this is not the case.35 There are no specific and regular publications from provincial regulators 
that provide the level of depth required for analysis and there seems to be no systematic approach for 
collecting and reporting the volume of the transactions by types of issuers, types of investors or types of 
securities.36 There are also no data on the redemptions of securities that were issued to investors, so all 
reported numbers are on a “gross” basis and there is no information on the duration of securities (i.e., the 
length of time a particular redeemable or a normal debt security remains issued and outstanding prior 
to redemption or its rollover by an issuer). The information about redemptions and duration is important 
for understanding the true size of the exempt market since it is claimed that a larger number of financial 
institutions use exempt markets to raise short-term money. If that is indeed the case, then it inflates the 
importance of the exempt market based on aggregated data using overall gross numbers that are reported 
by the media.37 The currently available data are not comprehensive, nor is there a readily available 
database that has all the attributes required for a fact-based independent analysis of the exempt market. 
It is not even clear whether the data are being collected at the level of granularity required and, if they 
are being collected, if the respective securities commissions have a budget, or co-operative desire, to 
analyze this data in a collaborative way so that a national picture of the Canadian exempt market is made 
available to researchers, policy-makers and other interested parties.
On the face of it, one may think that one of the main reasons the exempt market came into being was the 
need for SMEs to seek equity (and, at times, debt) capital from individual investors on an efficient and 
less costly basis.38 This would potentially respond to the hypothesis that SMEs face an equity gap: they 
need equity capital, but in amounts too small to interest institutional investors, so the exempt market can 
facilitate easier access to sophisticated investors. However, given the current state of available data, it is 
not possible to segregate out the capital raised by SMEs (both equity and debt) in the overall capital flow 
through the exempt market from accredited but individual investors, making it impossible to evaluate 
both whether individual investors and small firms are utilizing the exempt market, and their experience 
from these investments. After all, the reason for the regulation and creation of the exempt market is to 
allow this matchmaking for higher-risk capital in a cost-effective and efficient manner and to protect 
investors; however, if minimal or no data are available for analysis, then there is no way to tell whether 
this is in fact happening. 
Another concern is in regards to the potential duplication in interpreting the available data. For example, 
many companies on the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V) use the exempt market as a vehicle to raise 
additional equity capital in private placements, but since available data do not require the identification 
35 
This need for better data on the nature and the size of the exempt market is recognized by the OSC, which in June 2012 
launched an electronic version of the report (the E-form) which could be filed through the OSC’s website on a voluntary 
basis; it became mandatory as of February 2014. The BCSC also has an electronic filing system. Further information is 
available in OSC Staff Notice 45-708 Introduction of Electronic Report of Exempt Distribution on Form 45-106F1 (June 21, 
2012). http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_issuer_forms-45106f1-45501f1_index.htm.
36 
This is not to say that the aggregate data are not available; the challenge is that it is not available in the granularity that may 
be required for fact-based analysis.
37 
For example, an article by Jeff Gray in The Globe and Mail on July 31, 2012 stated that “The exempt market has grown 
enormously, with $86.5-billion raised in Ontario alone in 2011, up from $78.6-billion the year before, with observers 
blaming the tightening of the credit markets for pushing small companies to seek other sources of funding.”
38 
This, of course, is not the only reason for the existence of the exempt market. It can be used for securities that are very safe 
— for example, Government of Canada bonds — or it can be used by investors that do not require detailed information, or 
those who already have the required knowledge about the issuer either because they are the family or friends of an issuer 
seeking seed funding.
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of an issuer as an exchange-listed issuer (meaning whether or not the company is listed on an exchange 
like the TSX-V), there may be overlap in the reported amount raised through the exempt market and 
on Canada’s public markets.39 In addition, there are no data on the ex-post performance of the exempt 
securities, especially those that were issued as equity instruments. One may argue that it is not the role 
of the securities regulators to prevent losses from investments or to track performance once the security 
is purchased by investors. However, if such data were available, investors would have better information 
about the risk/return trade-offs associated with exempt-market securities, and the data could provide 
information to help assess the efficacy of disclosure rules.40 Moreover, since there are no such readily 
available data, a single investment gone bad gets undue attention and leads to calls for increasing 
scrutiny and additional rules.41 Therefore, it is imperative that minimum levels of data are considered 
necessary from a public policy perspective so that a fact-based debate can ensue on the efficacy and the 
extent of the exempt market.42 
There is another fundamental weakness in the currently available data. There are only limited data 
available on the cost of the transaction (since in some cases intermediaries may be involved) and on the 
degree of illiquidity (for example, liquidity can be ascertained in the case of public markets through the 
bid-ask spread, but this is obviously not applicable for private securities). This is especially so for equity-
type securities issued by SMEs and invested by individual accredited or eligible investors.43 It is well 
known that markets become transactionally efficient when transaction costs are known to the market. 
But the current state of information about the exempt market is not robust enough in this regard. With 
these caveats about the nature of the information on the exempt market, the next section provides an 
analysis on available data.
SCALE AND SCOPE OF THE EXEMPT MARKET
The source of data for this paper is multifold: it comes from websites of provincial securities regulatory 
commissions as well as from private correspondence and requests to the commissions.44 Most of the data 
were received in aggregated and non-interlinked tables and not all data were amenable to analysis at 
the individual sub-category level or were consistent across all provincial jurisdictions. As noted earlier, 
the data are on a “gross amount”-raised basis. Since it is possible that a large percentage of securities 
issued by financial institutions may be of redeemable or rollover debt securities, and the amount excludes 
redemptions, gross amounts may also overstate the importance of the exempt market as a source of 
39 
The total amount raised via seasoned equity offerings by TSX-V listed companies averaged $1 billion annually in 2011 
through 2013.
40 
This data may not be easy to track since there are trading restrictions on these securities. However, it is the same situation 
with venture capital and investments made by private equity firms; that data are now being collected and are being made 
available for analysis.
41 
For example, The Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor Rights (FAIR Canada) has claimed: “Widespread non-
compliance with the laws and regulations governing the loosely-regulated exempt market coupled with a high level of fraud 
and weak oversight harms investors and weakens confidence in the Canadian capital markets.”
42 
If securities commissions in Canada lack the budget, they can release the data free of charge to academic and other 
interested researchers, opening up exempt markets to fact-based analysis. There are no issues with respect to privacy since 
the identity of individual investors is not required. All that is required is information on the type of investor. If the identity 
of the firm needs to be protected, only the data regarding the type of firm and issue (private versus publicly listed; firm size; 
size of the issue; industry; type of security; etc.) can be released.
43 
For example, F1 and F6 filings in British Columbia include fees and expenses but are not reported as a matter of course. 
Such data are readily available for initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings of publicly listed firms. See, 
for example, Vijay M. Jog, “The Climate for Canadian Initial Public Offerings,” in Financing Growth in Canada, ed. P. 
Halpern (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1997), 357-401; as well as Tingle, Pandes and Robinson, “The IPO.”
44 
We asked for, but did not receive, any information from the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).
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permanent capital.45 In addition, Ontario only counts the funds raised within Ontario, whereas all other 
provinces report funds raised from within the province (inside) and outside the province, including from 
outside of Canada. So aggregating across provinces may also result in duplication. 
There were various sources of data for this paper. For British Columbia, the data for 2009–2013 were 
received from the BCSC. The source of the data is from the exempt-distributions report based on form 
45-106F1. The BCSC tracks data on debt versus equity and information about individual versus non-
individual investors, and they are available upon special request; the data provided were whatever were 
readily available at the time of request. The BCSC does not keep data on the size of company or the 
duration of debt securities. 
The data for Alberta came from the analysis of the annual reports entitled The Alberta Capital Market: 
A Comparative Overview. Additional data for Alberta came from the Alberta Securities Commission 
website, which provides summary data by issuer. However, the two sources provide inconsistent 
information, so I used the annual reports as my source for the analysis shown below. Similar to British 
Columbia, it is not possible to segment the data by size of the issuer, the type of security or the type of 
investor. 
The data for Ontario come from Appendix C of “OSC Exempt Market Review, OSC Staff Consultation 
Paper 45-712 – Considerations for new Capital Raising Prospectus Exemptions,” published in December 
2012, as well as underlying data provided by the OSC upon special request. Here again, the data do 
not allow for insights on the size of the issuer, the type of security (except for in 2012) or the type of 
investor. The data for New Brunswick come from the various issues of the Capital Markets Report 
published annually by the Financial and Consumer Services Commission of New Brunswick.46 In 
contrast to all other jurisdictions, the data do provide segmentation by type of security, but not by size of 
the issuer nor type of investor. No jurisdiction provides any data on costs of transaction or post-issuance 
performance of securities. There is also no way to find out the role and the extent of intermediaries in 
these transactions and whether or not there is double counting. Also note that we do not have data from 
the province of Quebec.
Given such disparity in data and different breakdowns used by individual provincial commissions, 
I provide data at the aggregate level (where such aggregation is possible) followed by data by each 
province where additional information was available and could be documented. Wherever necessary, 
I make reasonable assumptions, which are reported in this paper. As such, tables 1 through 7 provide 
aggregated data for the years 2010–2012 as these are the three years where data were available for all the 
jurisdictions and required a minimum number of assumptions. Since Ontario plays a large part in the 
exempt market, this paper provides specific tables related to Ontario to allow for better insight about the 
exempt-market characteristics.
Table 1 provides data by exemption type as per Section 2 – Division 1 of the National Instrument 45-
106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions, September 18, 2009 Volume 32, Issue 38 (Supp-5) where 
Section 2.3 refers to an accredited investor, Section 2.5 is the category for family, friends and business 
associates and Section 2.9 is the category for offering memorandum.47 It should be noted that OSC does 
not yet have an offering-memorandum exemption, so most of the funds raised in Ontario are under 
Section 2.3, the accredited investor category. The total includes funds raised by investment funds and 
other finance companies and is a simple aggregate of data received from various sources listed above. 
It should be noted that it is possible that there may be some double counting here since all provinces 
45 
Financial institutions normally raise short-term financing via the short-term debt exemption. There are currently no 
reporting requirements for this and hence it is not captured as part of the exempt-market data set in any jurisdiction.
46 
Due to time and effort limitations, I did not track the data for any other province.
47 
The categories are: 2.1 Rights Offering; 2.2 Reinvestment Plan; 2.3 Accredited Investor; 2.4 Private Issuer; 2.5 Family, 
Friends and Business Associates; 2.6 Family, Friends and Business Associates – Saskatchewan; 2.7 Founder, Control Person 
and Family – Ontario; 2.8 Affiliates; 2.9 Offering Memorandum; 2.10 Minimum Amount Investment.
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except Ontario include both capital raised inside the province and outside by issuers. Some or all of that 
outside capital raised may also be captured in Ontario’s numbers, depending on how the OSC captures 
and reports these numbers, since its totals include capital raised within (“inside”) the province regardless 
of issuer’s domicile. If one assumes that most of the “outside of province” funding in B.C. and Alberta 
comes from Ontario, these amount to $14.95 billion in 2012 (see Table 3).
TABLE 1 EXEMPT MARKET BY “CAPITAL RAISING EXEMPTIONS” ($BILLIONS)
  2.3 - Accredited Investor
2.5 - Family, friends 
and business 
associates
2.9 - Offering 
Memorandum Other Unknown Total
2012 121.76 0.59 0.97 9.38 6.21 138.90
2011 86.93 0.35 0.55 6.69 28.30 122.83
2010 84.51 0.38 0.65 6.10 24.09 115.73
Total 293.20 1.32 2.17 22.17 58.60 377.45
These numbers indicate that the exempt market facilitates over $100 billion each year of capital flow 
between borrowers and investors, including all types of securities, and that it is growing. The total 
amount is for all four provinces and it shows that the largest category of investors (77 per cent) is the 
“accredited investor” category; money raised from family, friends, business associates and the offering-
memorandum exemption is almost negligible.48 Other categories represent approximately 21 per cent of 
the total. Needless to say, the exempt market plays a significant role in Canadian capital markets.
Of the total amount raised, Ontario constitutes a significant percentage, as shown below in Table 2. The 
dominance of investment funds is also obvious – these constitute almost 65 per cent of the total funds 
raised in Ontario.49 This also leads to a potential for double counting since the gross amount that flowed 
into investment funds likely includes funds investing in other funds and investors redeeming in one fund 
and moving their capital to another fund; it is not limited to new capital invested.
TABLE 2 EXEMPT-MARKET CAPITAL FLOW – ONTARIO
Ontario — Capital Raised by Investment Funds vs. Other
($billions)
Year Investment Fund Non-investment Fund Total % of national total
2012 67.24 37.13 104.37 75.14%
2011 59.01 27.54 86.55 70.46%
2010 52.74 25.83 78.58 67.90%
2009 54.95 14.74 69.69 N/A
2008 71.92 20.24 92.16 N/A
The next table shows the breakdown by source of financing by province where “inside” denotes investors 
from within the province and “outside” represents the rest.
48 
Since Ontario has not yet adopted those exemptions, in Ontario issuers must use the accredited-investor exemption. 
49 
As noted by one reviewer, this is a very heterogeneous group. This category may include trust companies investing the 
comingled funds of trusts and estates under their control, private investment clubs or reinvestments by investment funds. 
It may also include the sale of securities to persons who have already purchased $150,000 or more of the particular fund. 
Thus, the aggregate figure, while interesting for its size, does not necessarily provide improved insights about the ultimate 
recipient of these funds.
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TABLE 3 EXEMPT MARKET BY GEOGRAPHY
Investment Sources by Province (for all issuers) — $billions
  AB ON BC NB
  Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside
2012 4.8 8.5 N/A N/A 13.86 6.45 0.01 0.29
2011 9.6 9.7 N/A N/A 11.86 5.64 0.01 0.015
2010 8.5 8.4 N/A N/A 11.88 7.76 0.01 0.17
Investment Sources by Province (for all issuers) — per cent
  AB ON BC NB
  Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside
2012 36.1% 63.9% N/A N/A 68.2% 31.8% 3.3% 96.7%
2011 49.7% 50.3% N/A N/A 67.8% 32.2% 40.0% 60.0%
2010 50.3% 49.7% N/A N/A 60.5% 39.5% 6.8% 93.2%
Table 3 shows that the exempt market is a national market and that investors have invested throughout 
the provinces. Although not shown here, a much higher percentage in New Brunswick and British 
Columbia has come from U.S. investors. This table also indicates that all provincial securities 
commissions should continue to harmonize all criteria for defining the issuers and accredited investors 
to ensure continued cross-provincial investments. As also noted earlier, OSC totals include capital raised 
within (“inside”) the province regardless of the issuer’s domicile. One may also conjecture that funds 
under the “outside” category are investments made by institutional investors in public or large private 
companies in that province.
Next, I show the breakdowns by issuer type. The reporting issuers are public companies that are already 
providing disclosure to investors and non-reporting issuers are issuers that are not public companies 
and therefore would have minimal (or at least less) information at the time of the issuance.50 As can be 
seen below, the exempt market is allowing non-reporting issuers to raise significant amounts of capital 
through the exempt market and investors are willing to invest in these issuers even with the limited 
amount of information available to them.51 The data are not robust for 2010, but there is an increase in 
the percentage raised by non-reporting issuers in 2012 compared to 2011. It should also be noted that 
non-reporting issuers are not necessarily small issuers; it simply means these issuers are not reporting 
issuers (e.g., public companies listed on a stock exchange).
50 
A reporting issuer includes any issuer that has: filed a prospectus and obtained a receipt for it from a Canadian securities 
regulatory authority; merged with a reporting issuer by a business combination or takeover bid; previously had its securities 
listed on a stock exchange; or received an order from the commission designating it a reporting issuer.
51 
As noted by one reviewer, it would be useful to know how much of the non-reporting category is investment funds and 
how much of it is large private companies (i.e., non-reporting issuers) as opposed to SMEs; whether there is an industry 
concentration among the non-reporting issuers; and whether there is a particular kind of offering (by type of security) by 
non-reporting issuers. 
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TABLE 4 EXEMPT MARKET BY REPORTING AND NON-REPORTING ISSUERS
Capital Raised by Reporting Status ($billions)
 Canada
  Reporting Non-Reporting Unknown Total
2012  27.73  98.05  12.51  138.29 
2011  18.68  76.14  28.35  123.17 
2010  13.81  31.65  69.83  115.30 
 Capital Raised by Reporting Status (per cent)
  Reporting Non-Reporting Unknown Total
2012 20.05% 70.90% 9.05% 100.00%
2011 15.17% 61.81% 23.02% 100.00%
2010 11.98% 27.46% 60.57% 100.00%
Next, we turn our attention to the type of securities offered through the exempt market, since one of 
the intentions behind creating an exempt market was to allow for the raising of higher-risk capital. 
Unfortunately, this data by security type are available only for 2012 and only for Ontario (non-
investment funds only) and New Brunswick (a much smaller market than Ontario’s) and thus there is 
a large percentage under the “unknown” category. However, what is somewhat surprising among the 
available data is that the equity raised through the exempt market is only five per cent of the total amount 
raised, but is still large in absolute terms.
TABLE 5 CAPITAL RAISED BY SECURITY TYPE, 2012
Capital Raised By Security Type – Non-investment Funds
  Debt Equity Other Unknown Total
2012 $billions 27.38 7.05 2.61 33.61 70.65
2012 percentage 38.75% 9.99% 3.69% 47.57% 100.00%
As can be seen above, the amounts raised through equity instruments in the exempt market were $7.05 
billion in 2012. This can be compared with $4.8 billion and $1.2 billion raised on the TSX under initial 
public offerings in 2010 and 2011 respectively; $1.5 billion each raised by venture capital in 2010 and 
2011; and $24 billion raised by TSX-listed companies through subsequent equity offerings in the same 
two years.52 Needless to say, the exempt market plays a significant role in Canadian equity markets, but 
most financing occurs through debt instruments.
Table 6 below segments the data by industry sectors. Due to internal inconsistencies, the aggregate 
numbers do not match exactly and some adjustments had to be made due to lack of data in certain cases 
for 2012. However, the numbers and the percentages are directionally correct. The most surprising part 
is that a significant percentage (65 per cent) of capital raised through the exempt market is either via 
investment funds or other financial-sector firms. It should also be noted that distributions of investment-
fund securities reflect distributions to both individual and institutional investors and distributions of 
both public and private investments. I also note that these data reflect purchases, but do not account for 
redemptions of securities. As such, there is no way to know the ultimate “resting place and the security 
types” for the amounts raised by these investment funds, nor the “net” amount, since some of these 
funds could have been redeemed in a very short period of time or rolled over to finance the 
52 
The data on IPOs come from Tingle, Pandes and Robinson, “The IPO,” Table 1; the rest come from a compilation from 
various sources including annual reports from the TSX and sources such as Capital IQ. We did not compile data for other 
types of securities such as debt and preferred shares. Note that there is a potential for double counting here as well since the 
venture capital market is part of the exempt market.
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redemption of an earlier issue. In addition, these data are limited because they are based on reports of 
exempt distributions filed with the OSC only. Also, only the specified prospectus exemptions trigger a 
requirement to file a report. As a result, these data do not capture all exempt-market activity.53
TABLE 6 CAPITAL RAISED BY INDUSTRY SECTOR
Capital Raised by Industry — Canada ($billions)
  Oil and Gas Others Financials  (includes funds) Real Estate Other Industries*
Unknown  
Industry Total
2012 9.22 3.61 12.60 2.36 4.72 106.30 138.81
2011 11.68 3.61 14.22 4.25 5.87 83.19 122.82
2010 11.58 2.88 14.94 2.54 7.12 76.66 115.72
Capital Raised by Industry — Canada (per cent)
  Oil and Gas Others Financials  (includes funds) Real Estate Other Industries*
Unknown  
Industry Total
2012 6.6% 2.6% 9.1% 1.7% 3.4% 76.6% 100.0%
2011 9.5% 2.9% 11.6% 3.5% 4.8% 67.7% 100.0%
2010 10.0% 2.5% 12.9% 2.2% 6.2% 66.2% 100.0%
**  Other industries include: biotech, forestry, high-tech, industrial, mining exploration/development, mining production, 
and utilities.
Since we have more detailed data from Ontario with respect to various industries excluding investment 
funds, they are shown below:
TABLE 7 INDUSTRY SECTOR COMPOSITION IN ONTARIO’S EXEMPT MARKET 
Capital Raised by Industry — Ontario, non-investment funds only ($millions)
  2008 2009 2010 2011
Financial Services 4,664 1,065 4,651 6,339
Mining 3,172 2,868 4,856 3,791
Oil and Gas 2,735 1,903 2,952 2,953
Real Estate 742 1,256 1,395 2,154
High-Tech 449 319 607 1,099
Utilities 4,440 616 301 846
Industrial 384 1,269 1,109 517
Biotech 1,017 130 109 243
Forestry 381 24 152 54
Other 2,254 5,290 9,699 9,542
Total 20,238 14,740 25,831 27,538
53 
For more details on data limitations, please see OSC, “Exempt Market Review: OSC Staff Consultation Paper 45-710 – 
Considerations for new Capital Raising Prospectus Exemptions” (2012), 18, footnotes 2 and 3.
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Capital Raised by Industry — Ontario, non-investment funds only (percentage)
  2008 2009 2010 2011
Financial Services 23.0% 7.2% 18.0% 23.0%
Mining 15.7% 19.5% 18.8% 13.8%
Oil and Gas 13.5% 12.9% 11.4% 10.7%
Real Estate 3.7% 8.5% 5.4% 7.8%
High-Tech 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 4.0%
Utilities 21.9% 4.2% 1.2% 3.1%
Industrial 1.9% 8.6% 4.3% 1.9%
Biotech 5.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.9%
Forestry 1.9% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2%
Other 11.1% 35.9% 37.5% 34.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The four most important sectors that use the exempt market are financial services, mining, oil and gas, 
and real estate. Although not shown here for the sake of brevity, the percentage represented by the oil 
and gas sector is significantly higher in Alberta. If one combines insights from tables 6 and 7, it may lead 
to the conclusion that the biggest users of the exempt market continue to be financial institutions that 
can raise potentially short-term debt capital relatively free of securities regulation, and the growth in the 
exempt market has not been just because of the (equity) capital needs of SMEs.
The overall conclusion from this section is that the status of the data and the ability to analyze these data 
in any shape or form for informed decision-making is limited. The data collected are inconsistent and 
available in tabular form with no ability to link across various tables or across provincial commissions. 
There is a high potential for double counting and an inability to net out the amounts related to 
“redemptions or rollover” of debt securities from the aggregated reported amounts. Since the accredited-
investor exemption includes not only wealthy individuals but also institutions, it provides no insight 
about the participation of individuals in the exempt market and the type of securities in which they 
invest. The exempt market is dominated by investment funds, but very little information is available on 
them or about their ultimate investment vehicles. 
Notwithstanding the fact that many securities issued under the exempt market are illiquid, there is 
also no information on the performance of these securities (especially equity securities by small firms 
invested by individual investors). This lack of information is lamentable since this type of information 
is necessary to investigate the efficacy of this market in matching borrowers and investors by showing 
the range of realized rates of return. These data, if they were to be available, might lead to regulatory 
changes with respect to the degree and quality of information and they can provide another signal for 
investors about this market.
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The main objective of this paper was to identify and summarize empirical evidence on the state of the 
Canadian exempt market given its obvious importance in facilitating capital flows between investors and 
firms. The intent was to use this evidence to make some firm observations and then propose some policy 
alternatives, if any, for potential improvements to the current state of information about this market.
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As noted, the current state of data availability that is necessary for such robust analysis and informed 
observations is severely lacking. For a market that provides in excess of $100 billion annually of gross 
capital flow, this lack of data availability is unacceptable and requires a significant and immediate 
improvement. In the absence of improved information, policies would be made based on anecdotal, 
incomplete and, potentially, incorrect evidence and selected data and thus would be sub-optimal at best.
As a result of my analysis presented above, I propose that all provincial jurisdictions and major market 
participants convene and form an “exempt market data repository” to which each and every jurisdiction 
and all key market participants (e.g., the exempt-market dealers) would contribute structured data. It 
could be funded through a small fee levied on each issuer based on the issue size and type. As a first 
step towards this, all contributors should agree on the granularity of the data that must be collected 
at the origination stage and then on an ongoing basis, as well as their own roles and responsibilities. 
Since there are three participants at the origination stage, the data required should be specific to each 
participant.54
As a start, the issuer categorization should allow for segmentation on industry, size of the issuer, 
domicile of the issuer, and whether it is a reporting issuer or not. Next, the granularity at the issue level 
would be the size of the issue, security type (e.g., debt or equity), the main reason for the funds being 
raised (e.g., capital expansion, working capital, redemption or rollover of another security, etc.), duration 
of the security (important for debt securities, because the exempt market is being used for overnight or 
very short-term capital), and the restrictions on trading (to allow for identifying the liquidity risk). As 
noted in the main body of the paper, the current data are restricted only to issuances and there are no 
data about redemptions. To alleviate this deficiency, each issuer must notify the redemption of a specific 
issue; this would allow for understanding the gross and the net capital flows through the exempt market. 
Next, if intermediaries are involved in raising capital, it must be made mandatory that the costs of the 
intermediation be revealed.55 The information is especially important since the role of investment funds 
in the exempt market has increased. This is not an unusual requirement and is currently imposed on 
the initial-public-offering issues. Moreover, it is imperative that these investment funds are subjected 
to a similar level of reporting about their own investment portfolio.56 This information on the cost of 
intermediation would allow for improved understanding of the transaction efficiency of the exempt 
market. 
Another key deficiency of the current data is a complete lack of systematic information about the 
investor along the lines of the specific exemption type as per Section 2 – Division 1 of the National 
Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions, September 18, 2009 Volume 32, Issue 38 
(Supp-5). The most important part of this disclosure would be to further separate category-type 2.3 — 
“accredited investor” — into individual-investor and institutional-investor types, and then by size and 
type of investment. This is critical since two of the objectives of the exempt market are to increase the 
flow of higher-risk capital to SMEs and to expand the opportunity set for individual investors.
While the above requirements are focused on information to be assembled at the origination time, 
there is also a dire need for systematic data on the duration and performance of these securities, 
especially securities issued by non-reporting issuers, and even more importantly, equity issues issued to 
individual investors. One of the important characteristics of efficient capital markets is the availability of 
information on the performance of securities so that investors are able to assess the risk-return trade-offs 
and are able to make informed decisions about their future investments in similar types of securities. 
54 
They are: the issuer/borrower, investor, and an intermediary (e.g., exempt-market dealer).
55 
This is not an unusual thing to ask. The proposed Client-Relationship Model 2 (CRM2) is designed to provide such 
information from the mutual fund industry.
56 
This will also be the case for mutual funds. Starting in July 2016, all securities commissions will require registered firms 
to disclose all charges incurred by the client and all other compensation received by the registered firm that relates to the 
client’s account.
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This information would also allow regulators to evaluate the required level of regulation. As such, it 
is imperative that such data should be forwarded by the issuer on at least an annual basis. Given that 
many, if not all, investments may be illiquid, these data might be quite problematic to get, since there is 
no market price and returns are not known until there is an exit — which may be many years after the 
investment is made. If no exit has taken place, this can be alleviated by requiring that the information 
simply say that no returns can be calculated until exit.57
I am aware that the provision, collection, and analysis of data all impose costs on the system and the 
higher the degree of detail required, the higher the cost. At the extreme, if the demand for information 
becomes high and costly, both parties may simply stop using that particular avenue to raise capital.58 
This is not my intent with these recommendations. I believe that if the exempt market is to claim its 
legitimate place in the overall capital-markets environment in Canada, it cannot do so unless all parties 
involved in this market, including the securities commissions and key intermediaries, come together 
and systematically act on providing, collecting, analyzing and reporting the required information to all 
participants in a way that does not impose significant new requirements for disclosure and increased 
costs. The data would allow for robust analysis and informed policy decisions. I am aware of the recent 
initiative of the Ontario Securities Commission to require issuers to provide such data and I believe 
that this initiative by the OSC should be welcomed; it captures many of the data points required for 
enriching our understanding about the exempt market.59 I also note that the offering memorandum under 
the offering-memorandum exemption already provides some part of this information, so provision of 
this information may not be considered as extra or costly. However, I believe that there is a lot that can 
be done if all provincial and territorial securities commissions and key exempt-market participants 
collectively tackle this challenge.
Lastly, there needs to be a broader debate about the role of a securities regulator when it comes to 
regulating capital flows between investors and issuers. First, the regulator needs to create a clear 
definition of accredited, eligible or sophisticated investor; investors classified under these definitions 
would be expected to seek whatever information they deem necessary and would be capable of analyzing 
the received information prior to making an investment decision. Under this scenario, there may not be 
any role for a securities regulator in terms of the extent and the frequency of the information disclosure. 
However, the securities regulator may ask from the issuer information on the amount of funds raised, 
the type of security, and the rates of return, and regularly publish the results based on the analysis of the 
57 
Similar challenges exist in determining the performance of venture-capital and hedge-fund investments; however, these 
data are being collected and reported. In the U.S., VentureOne collects information on financing rounds that include 
at least one venture capital firm with US$20 million or more in assets under management. For analysis of returns, see 
Bruce Booth, Data Insight: Venture Capital returns and loss rates, Forbes.com, November 7, 2012, http://www.forbes.
com/sites/brucebooth/2012/11/07/data-insight-venture-capital-returns-and-loss-rates/. Similarly, the TSX Private Markets 
platform (www.tsxprivatemarkets.com) allows approved participants on the platform to access the detailed company 
information, including term sheets, offering memoranda, available offerings, secondary-market quotes, and other 
associated documentation posted by the company. Individual registered investors and companies can access limited 
company information and would be notified if a posted company has a capital formation and/or secondary trading offering 
available, but will not be able to directly view details of those offerings. The point is that third-party groups can be asked to 
participate in the collection of structured data.
58 
Some have argued that in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era, the cost of disclosure for publicly listed companies is now so high 
that micro-cap firms are delisting themselves from the stock exchanges and private firms are finding alternative exit avenues 
other than a listing on the stock exchanges.
59 
See, OSC Staff Notice 45-708, Introduction of Electronic Report of Exempt Distribution on Form 45-106F1 
(June 21, 2012). More specifically, in June 2012, the OSC launched an electronic version of the report (or “e-form”) that 
can be filed through the OSC’s website. It stated that the goal in providing an e-form is to both make it easier for filers to 
prepare and file the report and also to facilitate the OSC’s ability to review the data contained in the report. The information 
required to be included in the report did not change and no new reporting requirements were added at that time. Issuers and 
underwriters that are required to prepare and file a report may now choose to prepare and file the report using the e-form, 
instead of in paper format. The electronic filing of the report became mandatory in February 2014, although it is not clear, 
based on the OSC’s internal budget constraints, who would have access to the electronic information beyond the reports the 
OSC creates and distributes. Also see the March 20, 2014 OSC publication proposing new “Reports of Exempt Distribution” 
forms, as mentioned in Section 6 of the notice or Appendix E.
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data.60 If the results indicate that the rates of return on specific types of investments and firm types are 
not appropriate, investors would adjust their information requirements, conduct more due diligence, or 
withhold capital from these types of firms. Moreover, if investors are institutional and issuer firms are 
large and considered as “reporting” issuers, then the securities regulator may not impose any additional 
information-disclosure rules, since a considerable degree of information is already available. However, 
the current state of data on exempt-market transactions or experience reveals very little about what 
direction regulators should take while facing this “regulatory conundrum.” Evidence-based regulation 
is critical and important not only for investors but for securities regulators, hence the greater need for 
useful, transparent and readily available data about the exempt market.
60 
British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) has implemented an automated exempt-distribution-report risk model that 
reviews and assesses all exempt-distribution reports for a number of high-risk factors. 
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